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NOTES
ance of such expenses would be in accord with the Internal Revenue
Service policy of including income from illegal businesses as taxable
income' and with the purpose of the tax laws to tax net income
and leave it to other legislation to penalize or eliminate illegal busi-
75nesses.
Because of the influence of the sixth amendment's guarantee of
right to counsel on the deductibility of legal expenses, Tellier should
have a very limited effect on the deductibility of other expenses
denied on public policy grounds but outside the legal expense area.
Charles D. Tuttle
Ground Water - Depletion of a Wasting Asset
INTRODUCTION
A depletion deduction, percentage or cost, gives the taxpayer an
offset to the exhaustion of valuable natural resources incident to the
production of income. The depletion allowance is often loosely de-
scribed as permitting a "return" of capital invested in a wasting
asset.' More precisely, it is the right to deduct certain sums (gen-
erally measured by production) in the computation of taxable in-
come. The actual economic advantage to the taxpayer depends largely
upon his particular tax rate and is not necessarily directly related to
his investment in the wasting asset. No real return of capital is
achieved. The depletion provisions being purely a statutory creation,
should not be confused with economic or geological concepts of
depletion.!
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The depletion issue, as it relates to taxation, was first raised under
the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909.' The Supreme Court dis-
allowed several claims for depletion allowance filed by mining cor-
" Reid, Disallowance of Tax Deductions on Grounds of Public Policy-A Critique, 17
Fed. B.J. 575, 580 (1957); 1 CCH 1965 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 5 681.234.
71 See notes 46 and 47 supra and accompanying text.
'Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1955); Johnson v. Phinney,
287 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1961); Untermeyer v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1935),
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 647 (1932).
aThe economic depletion concept is based primarily on the economic feasibility of the
recovery of the wasting asset in its entirety; the geological depletion concept is based on
actual physical depletion of the wasting asset.336 Stat. 112 (1909).
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porations under this act,' basing its decisions on the idea that an
excise tax (as opposed to an income tax) may be measured by any
computation of income specified by Congress, and that deductions
are a matter of legislative grace rather than inherent right Depletion
was first accorded statutory recognition in 1913," and until 1926 all
depletion allowances were based on cost. The sole exception was dis-
covery value depletion, which resembled cost depletion in amortizing
a fixed sum over the productive life of the property. It differed in
that the sum was not cost, but value at date of discovery.
In 1926 a statute allowing percentage depletion was enacted in
essentially the same form as it appears today Percentage depletion
was to provide a substitute for discovery value depletion' (which
it totally replaced in the 1954 Code) and to supplement cost de-
pletion provisions.!
The general statutory provision for cost depletion is section 611 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954:10
(a) GENERAL RULE-In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other
natural deposits, and timber, there shall be allowed as a deduction
in computing the taxable income a reasonable allowance for deple-
tion and for depreciation of improvements, according to the
peculiar conditions in each case....
Section 613 provides for a percentage depletion allowance:
(a) GENERAL RULE-In the case of the mines, wells, and other
natural deposits listed . . . the allowance for depletion . . . shall
be the percentage . . of the gross income from the property ....
(b) ....
(6) 15 percent-all other minerals. . . . For the purposes of this
paragraph, the term "all other minerals" does not include-
(A) soil, sod, dirt, turf, water, or mosses; or
(B) minerals from sea water, the air or similar inexhaustible
sources.
4 Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Scott, 247 U.S. 126 (1917); Stanton v. Baltic Mining
Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1915); Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
'Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, supra note 4, at 414. (Distinguished excise tax
as a tax on the privilege of conducting a business measured by income from an actual
tax on income.)
6Tariff Act of 1913, § II B, 38 Stat. 166 (1913), which provided for an "exhaustion"
deduction limited to 57 of gross value of output at the mine for that year.
7 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 204(c) (1), 44 Stat. 9 (1926).
'Discovery depletion allowed the discoverer of a mineral deposit to recover his costs
plus the appreciation in value of the property from discovery until the mineral was pro-
duced, and was often difficult to apply because of the difficulty in establishing initial property
value. 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 24.36 (rev. ed. 1960).
OSee Vinton Petroleum Co. of Texas v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1934).
so (All Emphasis added.) This is the basic depletion provision. See Int. Rev. Code of
1954, §§ 612, 1011, 1012.
[Vol. 19
NOTES
II. PERCENTAGE DEPLETION AND COST DEPLETION-A COMPARISON
Traditionally, to qualify for cost depletion it has been necessary
to estimate the total number of recoverable units of the natural
resource." A fraction, with the total number of recoverable units
as a denominator and the number of units produced and sold in the
current year as a numerator, is multiplied by the cost basis of the
wasting asset to determine the current year's depletion allowance."
In contrast, the percentage depletion allowance" is merely a statutory
percentage of the gross income realized from the extraction and
sale of the wasting asset. 4 There is no requirement that the extent of
total reserves be ascertained.
Cost depletion is generally independent of income. Theoretically
it is determined by the physical depletion for the taxable year, but
this is in turn dependent on the accuracy of the estimate of the
total recoverable reserves. Percentage depletion, however, is directly
proportional to yearly gross income with a maximum limitation
equal to one-half of net taxable income and is thus related to both
production and the market price of the product."
Cost depletion is limited strictly to the taxpayer's cost or other
tax basis. Theoretically, upon total physical depletion of the recover-
able reserve, the taxpayer will have been entitled to tax deductions
under the cost depletion provision equal to his initial tax basis in
the recoverable reserve. The actual economic advantage to the tax-
payer is considerably less than the cost of the asset depleted and de-
pends on his income and tax rates for the years during which the
depletion occurred. s
Percentage deduction is not predicated on a cost basis nor is the
total depletion allowance limited by a strict theory of recovery of
" The courts have recognized the difficulty of estimating the amount of deposits for
this purpose. E.g., United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927), where the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Brandeis, said:
The fact that the reserve is hidden from sight presents difficulties in making
an estimate of the amount of the deposits. The actual quantity can rarely be
measured. It must be approximated. And because the quantity originally in the
reserve is not actually known, the percentage of the whole withdrawn in
any year, and hence the appropriate depletion charge, is necessarily a rough
estimate. But Congress concluded, in the light of experience, that it was better
to act upon a rough estimate than to ignore the fact of depletion.
saFor examples of calculations in varying circumstances see Treas. Regs. §§ 1.612
(1960), 1.1014 (1960).
"aInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613(a).
"4See Treas. Reg. § 1.613 (1959).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613 (a). Generally speaking percentage depletion and cost
depletion are alternate, mutually exclusive methods of allowance, and unless expressly pro-
hibited, a taxpayer may select the method which will give him the greatest tax savings.
See 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 24.31a (rev. ed. 1960).
" See text following note 1 supra.
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capital." The percentage depletion allowance may be deducted as
long as there is income derived from the wasting asset" and thus
may give an economic advantage greater than the cost of the asset.
III. "ECONOMIC INTEREST"
The most basic, and perhaps the most controversial, requirement"9
for the utilization of any depletion allowance is that the taxpayer
have a "capital investment" or an "interest" in the natural resource
for which he seeks a depletion allowance. The problem frequently is
posed in terms of "economic interest," as defined in the landmark
case of Palmer v. Bender." Prior to that case, the courts had become
mired in attempts to correlate "economic interest" with legal title,
insisting that a taxpayer only could have an "economic interest" if he
owned an estate in the wasting asset." The Supreme Court's decision
in Palmer v. Bender broadened the concept of "economic interest"
by disregarding ownership or legal title and looking rather at the
taxpayer's right to share in the resource produced."' This concept in
later cases was limited by the somewhat illusory distinction between
teconomic interest" and "economic advantages."'
IV. UNITED STATES V. SHURBET 4
The taxpayer, an irrigation farmer in the Southern High Plains
region of the United States, claimed a cost depletion allowance for
water removed from a ground water reservoir beneath his property
"Winnsboro Granite Corp. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 974, 984 (1959); Belridge Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1044 (1957), aff'd, 267 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1959).
s The total recovery under the depletion allowance may be far in excess of cost.
10 See note 42 infra.
"0287 U.S. 551 (1933). The definition has been codified in the regulations. See note 42
infra.
21 See 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 24.20 (rev. ed. 1960) ; Sneed, The Economic
Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 Texas L. Rev. 307, 309-318 (1957).
"2in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933), Mr. Justice Stone states:
Similarly, the lessor's right to a depletion allowance does not depend upon his
retention of ownership or any other particular form of legal interest in the
mineral content of the land. It is enough if, by virtue of the leasing trans-
action, he has retained a right to share in the oil produced. If so he has an
economic interest in the oil in place, which is depleted by production.
" Scofield v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 268 F.2d 699, 707 (5th Cir. 1959). Here the
court states that the phrase "economic interest" is not to be taken as embracing a mere
economic advantage derived from production through a contractual relationship with the
owner by one who has no capital investment in the mineral deposit. See also Helvering v.
Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938); Sneed, The Economic Interest-An Expanding
Concept, 35 Texas L. Rev. 308 (1957). For a discussion of cases considered by the Supreme
Court, illustrating the evolution of "economic interest" after Palmer v. Bender, see Traynor,
Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1937 Term, 33 Il. L. Rev. 371, 391 (1938).
24347 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1965). The Internal Revenue Service will follow this decision
in cases involving taxpayers in the Southern High Plains. See Rev. Rule 65-296, 1965-50
Int. Rev. Bull. The district court opinion is noted in 42 Texas L. Rev. 260 (1964).
and used to irrigate his crops. The Southern High Plains is a plateau
area located in northern Texas and eastern New Mexico encompassing
approximately 35,000 square miles. Underlying this Plains region is
the Ogallala formation, a stratum of fresh water trapped during
formation of the area millions of years ago. The Ogallala formation
is surrounded by relatively impermeable "red beds" in the shape of
a shallow bowl which allows no appreciable percolation or flow into
or from the formation. The only source of new water entering the
formation is precipitation. Thus, under natural conditions, the reser-
voir is in a state of dynamic equilibrium25 and would not be re-
plenished once it is depleted.
Taxpayer Shurbet had paid $25 per acre for the ground water
under 380 acres of his farm acquired in 1946 and $120 per acre for
ground water under the remaining 100 acres acquired in 1953.2'
Shurbet introduced evidence that at the respective purchase dates
the saturated thickness of the water reservoir beneath the 380 acre
tract was 342 feet and beneath the 100 acre tract, 332 feet. He also
established that through 1959, the level of saturation (water level)
of the formation beneath his farm had subsided 5.9 feet. The court
stated that Shurbet could deplete the water beneath his land, and
computed the deduction by multiplying his cost basis in the ground
water by the fractional decline in the water level of the reservoir
during the tax years in question."
There was no doubt that, under state law, the ground water in the
formation was owned by taxpayer" or that it was of substantial
value. The basic question was whether there was an express or im-
plied prohibition of a depletion allowance for an exhaustible reservoir
of ground water which is in effect "mined."
" This is a truism as, if more water had flowed into the reservoir than had been lost by
extrication or evaporation, etc., during the milleniums, it would have overflowed; and con-
versely, if the recharge had been less than the loss, the formation would long ago have been
depleted. In the Ogallala formation it appears there is currently a slight natural recharging
of the formation. It was estimated that at the present rate of charge it would take thirty
centuries to refill the reservoir if it were emptied. Thomas, The Conservation of Ground
Water 46 (1951), cited in Brief for Appellee, p. 25.
2Total cost per acre of the two tracts was $100 and $280 respectively. Thus 25%
and 43% of the total cost of the two tracts respectively was attributable to the value of
the underlying ground water. Taxpayer proved his basis by establishing he was aware of
the water reservoir prior to the purchase of the land and at that time intended and did
pay the above amounts because of the presence of irrigation water. See the district court's
opinion in Shurbet, 242 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
1 5.90/342 of $9,500 plus 5.90/332 of $12,000 equals $377.19. This method of cal-
culation is a notable and somewhat arbitrary departure from the conventional method of
calculating cost depletion. See note 37 infra.
" Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904); Gillette v.
Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7880-3c(D)
which states: "The ownership and rights of the owner of the land, his lessees and assigns,
in underground water are hereby recognized...."
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The court of appeals, in affirming the district court, found that
the ground water in the Ogallala reservoir underlying taxpayer's
farm was a "natural deposit" within the meaning of the federal in-
come tax statutes,2 9 but specifically limited this determination to the
particular facts and characteristics of the Ogallala reservoir."' The
court also decided that the exclusions of the percentage and cost
depletion provisions are independent of each other. In so doing, the
court rejected the argument advanced by the Commissioner that
because both provisions referred to "natural deposits"'" the exclusion
of water from this general term in section 6132 also applied to sec-
tion 611.3 Thus, even though water is specifically excluded from
percentage depletion," it is not excluded from cost depletion.
Sale of the production from the wasting asset is not necessary to
qualify for cost depletion, for here the taxpayer used the water for
irrigation purposes. Use rather than sale has previously been approved
by the courts in allowing cost depletion;' however, in all previous
cases the number of units actually produced in the year was employed
as a basis for the depletion allowance. In Shurbet, not all of the de-
cline in the water level could necessarily be attributed to the tax-
payer's production. The recent tendency of the courts to disregard
the requirement of a sale to establish, for cost depletion purposes, the
quantity of the wasting asset produced during the year is probably a
derivative of the trend in recent percentage depletion cases.' In these
2 See text following note 10 supra.
30347 F.2d at 107. Judge Rives states:
The main thrust of the government's argument is that ordinary ground water
is not a "natural deposit" for cost depletion purposes. In that connection, we
would confine the holding in this case to the water extracted by taxpayers
from the Ogallala formation in the Southern High Plains. (Emphasis added.)
Under the rationale of this case, water is not necessarily an inexhaustible resource but
under conditions existing in the Ogallala reservoir it was definitely being exhausted.1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 611(a), 613(a).
" See text following note 10 supra.3 Ibid. Cf., Flona Corp. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. Fla. 1963), which
held that the exclusion of sod from percentage depletion allowance did not exclude it from
cost depletion allowance.34 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613 (b) (6) (A). The underlying policy in granting per-
centage depletion is the dependence of the civilian economy and national safety on certain
commodities. See Baker and Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence, 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 361, 362 (1951).
"SGatilff v. Helburn, 31 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky. 1940) (royalty holder in coal lands
entitled to depletion on total amount mined and not just the amount sold). Contra, Inspira-
tion Consol. Copper Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1425, 1431 (1928) (depletion deduc-
tion limited to number of pounds of copper sold during the year instead of number of
pounds produced).
" United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76 (1960) (the court allowed
the taxpayer to establish a constructive income from the market value of raw material
and take a percentage depletion on this income although the material was actually used
by taxpayer in subsequent manufacturing processes); United States v. Longhorn Portland
Cement Co., 328 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1964) (limited depletable gross income to crush
cement rock rather than income from finished cement) ; United States v. Portland Cement
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cases where the asset is used rather than sold, a constructive gross in-
come is used as a basis for percentage depletion allowance.
V. THE ENIGMAS POSED BY SHURBET
A. Method Of Computing Depletion Allowance
The conventional method of determining the cost depletion allow-
ance is governed by Treasury regulation section 1.611-2 which con-
templates the calculation of a "depletion unit"-the estimated num-
ber of recoverable units remaining as of the taxable year, divided
into the adjusted basis which the taxpayer has in the mineral prop-
erty. The allowance is then computed by multiplying the depletion
unit by the number of units of the deposit which were sold in the
taxable year.3" The Shurbet case, though limited to its facts, un-
doubtedly eliminates any requirement of a sale of the asset. The
court's method of calculation of the depletion allowance is not a
function of the quantity of units of the mineral produced; thus, it
would be possible for a taxpayer to compute a depletion allowance
(by the decline in the water table beneath his property) without the
necessity of showing that he actually produced the water. The only
express requirement set forth is that the water table decline under
taxpayer's property and that he be able to ascertain the decline in
the water table with reasonable certainty. The court's method of
calculation of the depletion allowance secures a just result," but it
is a considerable departure from the traditional method of computa-
tion in which the quantity of units produced is the determinative
Co. of Utah, 338 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1964) (constructive income on which depletion
allowance is to be based is the market value at the first stage in which the material can
be said to have commercial marketability). See also Henderson Clay Products v. United
States, 199 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Tex. 1961); and cf. The North Carolina Granite Corp. v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C. 149 (1964).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(1) (1960) states:
The basis upon which cost depletion is to be allowed in respect of any
mineral property is the basis provided for in section 612 and the regulations
thereunder. After the amount of such basis applicable to the mineral property
has been determined for the taxable year, the cost depletion for that year shall
be computed by dividing such amount by the number of units of mineral
remaining as of the taxable year. . . and by multiplying the depletion unit,
so determined, by the number of units of mineral sold within the taxable
year. ...
See text accompanying notes 25 and 26 supra.
a8 Although an anomalous situation is created by allowing a taxpayer, regardless of
how he uses the property or whether he produces the water, a depletion allowance if he
can prove a cost basis in the water, it might be rationalized by regarding the depletion as a
reduction in the value of the right to produce the water and as this right is lost (by
lowering of the water table) the taxpayer suffers loss. However, losses are not normally
deductible unless evidenced by "closed and completed transactions." Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1 (b)
(1964).
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factor."5 The court has adopted, in effect, the method of calculating
depletion allowance established in certain instances for natural gas.4'
The use of a cost depletion allowance which is not dependent on
production raises a myriad of questions as to the method of computa-
tion available to a holder, other than a fee owner, of an "economic
interest" in the depletable resource. Illustrative of the problem is the
dilemma facing the purchaser of water rights for a period of years."
The discussion thus far has raised the question of whether the
taxpayer must realize income from the depletion of his wasting asset.
Treasury regulation section 1.611-1,4" imply that income (or con-
structive income) is required. If so, and if the income must result
directly from the sale of the mineral produced, Shurbet is incon-
sistent since it dispenses with production, a fortiori with income.
The inconsistency disappears if indirect income (e.g., sale of a crop
irrigated by the water) is sufficient. In either case depletion is denied
the investor who purchases land and holds it idle but does not pro-
duce the underlying water, even though the water declines by natural
means or neighbors' drainage. Shurbet fails to state how much (if
any) connection there must be between the decline in water and
some income earning activity.' If income is required (directly or
indirectly) from the depletion of the wasting asset, the problem also
8" Any attempt to measure depletion by recording the number of units is complicated by
the fact that a considerable percentage of the water produced returns to the formation in
the irrigation process.
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2 (a) (4) (1960) provides for calculation of depletion of natural
gas by using a fraction consisting of the decrease in rock pressure during the taxable year
divided by the total decrease in rock pressure anticipated over the productive life of the
reservoir.
" Two alternatives in this situation are: (1) depletion allowance based on his actual
use during the taxable year divided by his total estimated use over the period of his interest;
(2) a depletion allowance which disregards production or decline in the water table but is
based rather on the fraction of time which his interest has to run. This would be the
application of a depreciation concept to depletion.
4 Treas. Reg. 1.611-1(b)(1) (1960):
Annual depletion deductions are allowed only to the owner of an economic
interest in mineral deposits or standing timber. An economic interest is
possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has acquired by investment any
interest in mineral in place or standing timber and secures, by any form or
legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the mineral or
severance of the timber, to which he must look for a return of his capital.
But a person who has no capital investment in the mineral deposit or standing
timber does not possess an economic interest merely because through a con-
tractual relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuniary advantage derived
from production. (Emphasis added.)
43 Although the court recognizes in the opinion that the farmers of the Southern High
Plains use the water pumped from the reservoir in the irrigation of their farms, it does
not expressly limit the deduction to a person engaged in using or selling the water in an
income producing activity. Query: what about the farmer who makes personal use of
substantial amounts of water? (Any limitation on the depletion deduction based on the
"use" by the taxpayer becomes very complex as it would not only involve a determination
of how much water was used, but also for what purpose.)
arises as to how the income is derived,44 how much is required, and
how it is to be determined. Conceivably, if income "from" the asset
is required and the amount of depletion allowance is not a function
of production or income from the sale of the asset (as the court held
in the Shurbet case) then a very small income could justify a full
depletion allowance based on a decline of the water table.45
Another problem, assuming the taxpayer has established the re-
quired separate cost basis in the water reservoir, is the possibility that
the taxpayer's cost basis cannot be accurately reduced to a dollars per
unit area figure. This would most likely occur when the ground water
formation beneath the land varies considerably in thickness. To
complicate further the computation of the depletion allowance in
light of the Shurbet case, each unit may not only have a different
cost basis but the fractional decline of water table for each unit may
also vary, thus necessitating a complex calculation.46 Shurbet, as a
test case,4" presented the court with an oversimplified set of facts; it
is clear that much more complicated situations could arise. It should
be observed that although the burden of proof as to the depletion
allowance is on the taxpayer," difficulty of proof and a willingness
by courts to recognize depletion" may lead to the adoption of less
precise methods of determining depletion allowances in circumstances
such as those discussed above. Nevertheless, cost depletion is always
a matter of approximation, more or less precise.
B. Physical Limitations
The court of appeals was careful to limit its opinion to the physical
factors present in the Ogallala reservoir." The extent of application
of this case to various types of ground water formations is highly
problematical. Probably the most obvious situation to which the
Shurbet holding could be extended would be a ground reservoir where
the recharge rate is substantial, but, due to the number of users, the
4The court in Shurbet seemed to be saying tacitly that the income was from the
water even though in reality the income was realized through the sale of crops which the
water aided in growth; however, portions of the income certainly could be attributed to
other factors than the presence of water, e.g., labor, seed, etc.
" Cf., Crabb v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 686 (1940). A small amount of production
was held to justify percentage depletion allowance on a much larger sum received as a
lease bonus.
" It is possible that the courts will allow an averaging technique to simplify this calcu-
lation.
" The court noted that the case was a test case for irrigation farmers in the Southern
High Plains. 347 F.2d at 104.
"Reinecke v. Spaulding, 280 U.S. 227 (1930).
41 See note I Isupra.
50 See note 30 supra.
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reservoir is steadily being depleted." For all practical purposes, the
property owners of such a reservoir face the same economic factors
as the farmers of the Southern High Plains: the value of their land
is substantially affected by the amount of recoverable water beneath
the property. The troublesome point in this hypothetical situation
is that the mineral is not really exhaustible (because of the substan-
tial recharge rate), although it may be depleted to the point where
it can no longer be recovered in substantial quantities. The difficulty
from an economic point of view stems from the possibility, which
may be very remote, that the reservoir, through a decline in number
of users or rate of use, may recharge itself. Then the taxpayers who
have taken the depletion allowance will receive a "windfall" because
they have depleted an asset that is not really exhaustible. Under the
example posed, even though it appears for all practical and economic
purposes that the landowners would share the same plight as farmers
in the Southern High Plains, it is doubtful that a depletion allowance
would be granted because the analogy to the exhaustible nature of
mineral and oil and gas deposits is negated by the substantial recharge
factor.
There are innumerable variations in physical factors which could
be presented in attempts to secure depletion allowances for ground
water; (e.g., effect of springs, underground watercourses, surface
flow, etc.) however, at the present time it appears doubtful that the
Shurbet holding will be extended substantially beyond the facts in
that case. The court, however, has failed to decide several crucial
issues which will determine the future importance of this decision:
(1) Is actual production necessary to qualify for the depletion de-
duction? (2) If actual production is required, does it have to be
pursuant to an income producing activity to qualify? (3) Is there
any limit on the disproportionality which the courts will allow be-
tween income and depletion deduction calculated by the decline in
water level? (4) May other common minerals qualify as a "natural
deposit" for depletion purposes?
Ronald L. Palmer
" Apparently the court ignored the recharge in the Shurbet case, probably under a
de minimis theory.
[Vol. 19
